Recently, the ‘Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker’ published a very interesting report on how the country's resources play a key role in sustaining the conflict.

The paper, entitled ‘Fuelling Sudan's War - How Gold Exports and Smuggling Are Prolonging Sudan's War’, is a joint effort with the interactive platform New Features Multimedia.

The research clarifies how gold - mined in different areas of the country, controlled partly by the Rapid Response Forces (RSF), and partly by the army (SAF), the two belligerents - plays a decisive role in sustaining the conflict. In fact, it is an easily transportable commodity that requires limited investment for extraction and has a huge demand on the market. A circumstance, the latter, which facilitates the strengthening of old alliances and, if necessary, the forging of new ones, all in the interest of financing the conflict.

The ‘gold rush’

It began in Sudan between 2009 and 2010, when interesting gold seams were discovered in different parts of the country; the richest and most promising in the Jebel Amir area in Darfur. Since then, gold has gradually replaced oil - most of whose deposits are located in the territory of South Sudan, which became independent in 2011 - as the country's major resource.

In the beginning, says the report, the industry provided a source of income for hundreds of thousands of unemployed youths, who mined the ore in an artisanal way. Then the government of then-president Omar El-Bashir - deposed in April 2019 by a palace coup orchestrated to limit the impact of a burgeoning popular revolution - stepped in to derive maximum benefit from the sector, both by exploiting artisanal mining and by seeking to modernise it to increase production, involving regional and international mining companies in the deal.

Wagner and Hemeti

Among the others, of particular importance were the Russian companies of the Wagner group, which acted in partnership with the commander of the RSF, Mohamed Dagalo, known by the nickname Hemeti, and other members of his family, which bases its wealth precisely on business in the field of gold mining and trading. In particular, Hemeti and his family have controlled the Jebel Amir deposits in North Darfur, their homeland, since 2017.

Since the first days of the outbreak of the conflict, the RSF have also seized gold, and silver, located at the government refinery in Khartoum. According to data from the Ministry of Mineral Resources, this consisted of 1.3 tonnes of unrefined gold, worth an estimated $150 million, and 15 tonnes of silver ready for export. Since then, the RSF has taken control of several other gold sites and ore processing plants that continue to operate. But it is impossible to have credible data on their production and marketing of the metal.

In 2017, 107 tonnes produced

In 2017, the last year of the regime of deposed President El-Bashir, for which there are official figures, Khartoum produced 107 tonnes of gold, placing it among Africa's top 10 producers. Then production decreased due to the political instability that led to the outbreak of conflict in April 2023.

In 2022, the last year of relative peace, production was 41.8 tonnes. But, says the report, it appears that this was only a decrease in the amount of ore passed by the relevant government institutions, while direct control by the army and RSF increased. It is estimated that 50 to 80 per cent of the gold was traded illegally, outside government control, during that period.

The ups and downs of production

According to official data from the Ministry of Mineral Resources of the de facto government of Port Sudan - the military government led by army commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan - with the outbreak of war, production plummeted for a few months (2 tonnes in the first six months of the conflict). By the end of 2023, however, it had already partially recovered (6.3 tonnes). In August this year it reached 29.2 tonnes worth USD 1.86 billion. By the end of this year, according to estimates by the chairman of the Sudanese Mining Company, it will be possible to export $2.182 billion worth of gold. These figures indicate that the government also de facto controls several gold sites and refining plants, particularly in the Red Sea coastal state, and in the Nile River and northern Sudan.

In these areas, which are firmly controlled by the army and, therefore, relatively safe, a number of foreign mining companies have also resumed operations. Among others, says the report, Mangem of the Moroccan royal family, Russia's Meroe Gold and Kush for Exploration and Production, the former owned by the Africa Corps, which took over from the dissolved Wagner Group and is directly controlled by the Kremlin.

The different gold routes

Gold produced in SAF-controlled areas and that produced in RSF-controlled areas take very different routes to market.

The RSF exports through Chad - where Hemeti has family ties with government officials - the Central African Republic - where he had, and has, very close ties with the Wagner/Africa Corps group - and Libya, where he maintains an alliance with General Haftar. All gold that does not appear in official reports. In return, the militia receives supplies of weapons and fuel.

The de facto government, on the other hand, uses its gold to consolidate old alliances or to forge new ones. The ‘diplomatic’ use of the ore has especially strengthened the already existing ties with Russia, to which it has provided resources to support the war in Ukraine, bypassing Western sanctions. The gold would be paid in rubles, which would immediately return to Moscow in payment for arms and ammunition. Contracts in the mining sector have been discussed in all the recent numerous meetings between the Russian and Sudanese rulers.

China-Africa Forum

Gold was also discussed during the last China-Africa Cooperation Forum, where the de facto president, al-Burhan, met with the association of Chinese mining companies.

The report also delves into the legal and illegal routes of trade. Alongside the now well-known route via the United Arab Emirates - which has always been used by the RSF - a route via Egypt has emerged, used by traders in de facto government-controlled areas who can no longer use the Emirates. These are mostly non-legal trades made possible by a vast network of Sudanese living in Egypt and Egyptian border agents.

Egyptian traders make a hefty profit: in Sudan, a gram of 21-carat gold costs 170,000 Sudanese pounds (around €265); in Egypt it is sold for 3.270 million Sudanese pounds (around €5,130).

It is not surprising, therefore, that human traffickers, who have so far facilitated the emigration of more than one million Sudanese refugees to Egypt, also ask to be paid in gold.

In view of this situation, the authors of the report appeal to the international community to declare Sudanese gold as a conflict-financing mineral and to punish its transactions according to current regulations. They also call for sanctions on companies and individuals who facilitate its trade with those already affected because they are accused of having responsibility for fomenting the conflict and supporting its continuation.

See, Sudan: l’oro che finanzia la guerra

Photo. Sudanese Rapid Support Forces show gold bars seized from a plane landing at Khartoum airport as part of an investigation into possible smuggling. ©  Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Reuters